Engineering-related business services sit at the core of Serbia’s EU-accession economy, yet they remain structurally under-analysed because they do not present themselves as a headline sector. They do not dominate GDP tables, they do not absorb large volumes of bank credit, and they do not announce billion-euro projects under their own name. And yet, by...
Engineering-related business services sit at the core of Serbia’s EU-accession economy, yet they remain structurally under-analysed because they do not present themselves as a headline sector. They do not dominate GDP tables, they do not absorb large volumes of bank credit, and they do not announce billion-euro projects under their own name. And yet, by...
By 2025, Europe’s industrial challenge stopped being framed as a shortage of capital or technology and became unmistakably a shortage of certified, deployable skills. Manufacturing plants, energy assets, grids, and infrastructure systems were increasingly constrained not by equipment availability, but by the lack of operators, technicians, and engineers authorised to run them under tightening regulatory regimes....
By 2025, European capital deployment into industry, energy, and infrastructure had become more selective, not because opportunities disappeared, but because technical risk moved to the centre of valuation. Assets are older, systems are more complex, regulation is denser, and performance assumptions are scrutinised more aggressively by lenders, insurers, and investment committees. In this environment, technical due...
By 2025, permitting emerged as one of the most decisive constraints on European industrial, energy, and infrastructure investment. Capital is available, technologies are mature, and demand is visible, yet projects stall because permits take longer, require more evidence, and face higher scrutiny than at any point in the last three decades. This is not a...
By 2025, European OEMs and industrial asset owners quietly acknowledged a structural imbalance in their operating models. Equipment fleets were growing more complex and more software-dependent, while internal teams responsible for lifecycle support were shrinking. Skilled technicians were harder to hire, travel budgets were under pressure, and sustainability rules discouraged constant on-site intervention. Yet the...
By 2025, European industry had largely solved the problem of data collection. Sensors, SCADA systems, historians, and enterprise platforms generated unprecedented volumes of operational information across factories, grids, fleets, and infrastructure assets. What remained unsolved was the harder problem: turning that data into decisions that materially improve performance under real operating constraints. This gap between data...
By 2025, one of the most persistent failure points in European industrial and energy projects was no longer technology, financing, or permitting. It was the interface between technical reality and contractual allocation of risk. Performance guarantees that do not reflect grid behaviour, liquidated damages that ignore commissioning constraints, availability metrics detached from operating conditions, and EPC...
By 2025, European industry reached an uncomfortable conclusion: traditional quality assurance models no longer scale. Plants are geographically fragmented, supplier bases are deeper and more global, and regulatory scrutiny has intensified. Yet the number of experienced inspectors, quality engineers, and certification specialists inside the EU is shrinking, not expanding. Travel costs, ESG constraints, and workforce...
By 2025, compliance stopped being an overhead and became a traded input into European industry. Carbon accounting, product traceability, lifecycle disclosure, and audit-ready documentation are no longer optional supplements to production; they are prerequisites for market access. The European Union’s regulatory stack—CBAM, the Digital Product Passport, expanded Scope 1–3 reporting, and supplier-level ESG audits—has effectively...
